The Villa, the Lake, the Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution,
- by Mark Roseman,
Allan Lane/Penguin, 2002.

(Published in BBC History Magazine, April 2002)


On the 20th January 1942, fifteen men met in "an elegant villa, in a cultivated suburb, in one of Europe's most sophisticated capitals" and discussed plans for genocide. That meeting, the "Wannsee Conference", has become a symbol of the measured, calculated brutality of the Third Reich. Yet, it is an event which is still widely misunderstood and one which provokes as many questions as it provides answers.

To coincide with the 60th anniversary of Wannsee, Mark Roseman has reassessed the conference and its significance in the development of the Holocaust. Its popular interpretations, he suggests, are incorrect. Wannsee could not have been called to promulgate a new "genocidal" policy against European Jewry, as that policy was already under way. Auschwitz-Birkenau had been in operation since the previous autumn and the death-camp at Belzec was already under construction. Neither can Wannsee be seen as an exercise in logistical planning. Its guest list contained no representatives of the German railways and no transport specialists. Similarly, Roseman argues that the conference cannot have been called to decide the fate of the so-called Mischlinge - "half-Jews" and "quarter-Jews". These categories were a legal nicety that was solely reserved for German Jewry, and though such matters were discussed, Wannsee had much wider, pan-European, ambitions.

In assessing Wannsee's significance, the author presents a brief examination of the development of the Holocaust - from the murderous rhetoric of Mein Kampf to the murderous deeds of the Einsatzgruppen. In contrast to some recent works on the subject, Roseman's analysis is refreshingly free from ideological "givens". He suggests that Nazi policy towards the Jews was largely evolutionary; reacting to circumstances and local expediency rather than being centrally driven. Sure, the Nazis were ideologically committed to eliminating Jewish influence from Europe, but exactly how that was to be achieved - whether by expulsion or extermination - was not clear. The Holocaust progressed through a climate of "policy drift" and through the influence of external factors, such as the entry of the USA into the war and Stalin's deportation of the Volga Germans. Crucially, Roseman says, there was no single, clear-cut order to murder all Jews.

So, in the absence of any 'grand scheme', what was Wannsee for? Roseman convincingly makes the case that the Wannsee Conference, rather than being the seminal moment in the development of the Holocaust, was, in fact, a symptom of the Nazis' 'administrative chaos' and the endemic infighting of the Third Reich. Its convenor and chairman was the regime's 'golden boy', Reinhard Heydrich. As Himmler's deputy and the head of the RSHA (Reich Security Main Office), Heydrich was responsible for many of those bodies - Gestapo, Kripo and SD - that were organising and carrying out 'the Final Solution'. His motive in calling the conference at Wannsee, says Roseman, was twofold. Firstly, he was stating to his rivals that his office was taking the central role in the Holocaust. He was staking his claim to be the primary authority in Jewish affairs, and was carving a niche for himself on an issue that he knew to be close to Hitler's heart. But secondly, and crucially, he was establishing a principal of collective guilt. By pulling all the major players of the Third Reich together at Wannsee, Heydrich was binding all of them to his murderous enterprise. None of them could later waver, murmur dissent or plead ignorance. Rather than a blueprint for genocide then, Wannsee could be seen as a purely administrative exercise.

Despite this revision of its significance, the Wannsee Conference is scarcely lessened in its impact. There is still no 'smoking gun', but the Wannsee protocol is at least a "signpost indicating that genocide had become official policy". Its use of verbiage and euphemism cannot disguise the meeting's hideous intent. It is still the closest document we have to a plan for the wholesale murder of Europe's Jews.

Mark Roseman's book is excellent. It is well researched, well argued and well written. As a reinterpretation of one of the most symbolic events of the 20th century, it is illuminating and thought-provoking. As a work of synthesis of the numerous schools of Holocaust historiography or as a short introduction to the subject, it deserves fulsome praise.


   
 

Roger Moorhouse
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